The Smithsonian institution, the Hudson's bay company and Russian Alaska (1859-1867)

Ted Binnema

My study of the Smithsonian Institution and the Hudson's Bay Company is connected with a larger book-length study tentatively entitled «A History of Science in the Hudson's Bay Company, 1670—1870». The beginning and end dates are explained by the fact that the Hudson's Bay Company received its charter in 1670, and sold its trading territories to Canada in 1870. Over the years, the Hudson's Bay Company's contributions to science were quite substantial. Before 1859, most of its contributions were to British institutions such as the Royal Society of London, the British Museum, and other lesser known institutions in England and Scotland, although it also made minor contributions to institutions in Canada. Then, between 1859 and 1867, there was a very remarkable surge of cooperation between the HBC and the Washington-based Smithsonian Institution. To give you an idea of the significance of this cooperation, one very conservative estimate is that the HBC contributed 12,000 natural history specimens to the Smithsonian during that period. The fact that one HBC trader, Robert Macfarlane, contributed 10,000 specimens, suggests to me that the overall contribution may well be as large as 20,000 specimens. Also, the HBC welcomed several scientists connected with the Smithsonian to travel to its territories. The most important of these, and the one most relevant to Russian America, is Robert Kennicott16 . Kennicott spent most of his time between 1859 and 1862 at HBC posts near, or even in Russian America, collecting specimens, keeping weather records, and conducting other research.

This surge of cooperation between the Smithsonian Institution and the HBC has attracted some scholarly interest. How was it that a British company and an American scientific institution cooperated with one another during a period of significant tension between Britain and the United States? Was there any connection between the efforts of the Smithsonian Institution and the purchase of Russian Alaska in 1867? Scholars have been divided on these questions.

What are the possible answers to the question?
1.  That the Smithsonian's cooperation with the HBC was a purely scientific enterprise.
In the most recent study, one historian of science, Debra Lindsay, has argued that the cooperation between these two institutions was a remarkable example of dispassionate scientific enterprise with no political overtones. She described it as «the first large-scale, apolitical, and noncommercial scientific study of Rupert's Land [as the HBC territories were known]. ...They were not concerned with territorial expansion, transportation routes, resource exploitation, or the suitability of the north for settlement »17 . One of the central arguments of my draft book manuscript is that science is never just about science, so you'll understand that I am skeptical of this argument. I would argue that it was quite simply impossible for this example scientific cooperation to be apolitical, quite simply because the conduct of science is inherently political. Even today, we understand intuitively that Russia, Canada, the United States, and Denmark carry out scientific research in the arctic, not merely driven by curiosity, but also because the carrying out of science in that location has non-scientific importance. This does not mean, however, that the Smithsonian Institution planned and executed its scientific research of northwestern America to at the behest of, or in support of a goal on the part of the United States to acquire all of North America.
2.  That the Smithsonian's cooperation with the HBC was part of an effort by the United States government to gather information about northwestern North America with a view towards possible acquisition of that territory.
It is unwise to divorce this scientific cooperation from the context in which it took place. For example, the cooperation took place during an expansionist period in US history. In 1845, John L. O'Sullivan introduced the term «Manifest Destiny» to the American lexicon when he wrote that it was the «mani-fest destiny» of the US «to overspread the continent allotted by Providence for the free development of our yearly multiplying millions». The war with Mexico tended only to fuel appetite for northern expansion among northerners in the USA. The US had already asserted a claim to the entire Columbia territory right up to the southern boundary of the Russian possessions in North America before settling for the 49th parallel as border. Still, in the 1850s and early 1860s, Americans poured into British Columbia during the gold rushes of 1858 and 1862. Remember too, that the Smithsonian Institution was a creature of the US government. The Institution's Board of Regents included the President and Vice President of the United States, the Secretary of State, the Secretary of War, the Attorney General, and other top US politicians. Its headquarters were within easy walking distance of both the White House and the United States Capitol Building.
As early as the end of the Crimean War (1856), perceptive Americans may have been able to sense the likelihood that Russian American might come up for sale. Right from the start, it had been Kennicott's explicit desire actually to travel to Russian America and when he traveled to the HBC territories he intended to travel from HBC posts to Russian America, but HBC traders always resisted. When he was in the northwest, Kennicott wrote to his superior that «it may not be for the interest of the H.B. Fur Co. to have the Yukon explored and known»18 . In 1860 he abandoned the plan. In 1865, however, he did go to Russian America as a scientist with the Russia-America Telegraph. He died in Russian America in 1866 of an apparent suicide.
So, it is possible that hopes that the American government might be able to purchase (or acquire by other means) Russian America influenced the efforts by the Smithsonian to learn more about Russian America — and northwestern North America generally — right from the start. I do not know enough about that history to say. However, I doubt it.Obviously, the theory could be sustained only if there was some evidence that some American officials anticipated an opportunity to buy or conquer Russian America by the end of 1858, and if people within the Smithsonian were encouraged by such American officials to learn more about Russian America.
3. That the Smithsonian Institutions efforts to cooperate with the HBC were rooted in other motivations.
I would argue that the Smithsonian Institution sought to conduct science in northwestern North America for its own reasons, not as part of any government plan to acquire Russian America.
The Smithsonian was not an arm of the American state. The best explanation for the cooperation is that heads of the institution wanted to enhance the institution's reputation as the pre-eminent authority on all aspects of the natural history, geography, meteorology, and climatology of North America. It was about empire-building perhaps, but primarily about the institution's scientific «empire». The directors of the Smithsonian were very ambitious to establish and expand the reputation of the institution.
On the other hand, the political and strategic importance of the research cannot be separated from the curiosity-based nature of the research. Debra Lindsay has argued that the Smithsonian actually possessed little information about Russian America before March 1867. I would argue that the institution by 1867 possessed a lot of valuable information about the climate and resources of the northwestern interior of North America. This included the Mackenzie Valley and even areas of Russian America itself. The information was sought and gathered by the Smithsonian primarily to serve the interests of the institution and its leaders, not as part of the government's agenda. It was also in the interests of the directors of the institution, after the sale, to emphasize the importance of the information that the institution provided. Several leaders of the Smithsonian, after the purchase, did claim to provide the government with important information. It was in their interest to exaggerate the value of that information.
Other questions that my research is exploring:
Why did the directors of the HBC cooperate so eagerly with the Smithsonian?
My answers are as follows: — The company had earned considerable prestige in the past by cooperating with scientists. Much of this prestige greatly enhanced the reputation of the company among politicians, scientists, and even a segment of the general public. This is the subject of my draft book manuscript. — Even before the cooperation began, the prospect of cooperating with an institution of the stature of the Smithsonian had the potential to benefit the company in many ways. After the cooperation began, it became clear that the directors of the Smithsonian Institution were very willing and effective at publicizing the contributions of the HBC to its efforts — confirming the company's hopes that its reputation would benefit from the cooperation with the Smithsonian. — After 1857, it was very clear that the HBC's days as a fur trading company were numbered. During the 1860s, it saw itself increasingly as a holder of potentially valuable real estate which it could sell. The directors may have believed that greater knowledge of its territories would increase its perceived value to eventual purchasers. (The lands were eventually sold to Canada in 1869.)
Why did various individuals work so hard on this research?
HBC Officers' motivations for cooperating ranged from avoiding boredom, satisfying curiosity, seeking promotion (the company did reward such cooperation), and seeking fame and recognition in scientific circles. Scientists such as Kennicott gained considerable fame, and could expect career advancement by travelling to remote regions to collect scientific specimens. The motivations of aboriginal people and HBC labourers were quite different. Their motivations were overwhelmingly monetary. Officers asserted that Natives and labourers refused to provide natural history specimens unless rewarded directly.
In sum, the surge of scientific cooperation between the HBC and the Smithsonian Institution did help establish the Smithsonian as the pre-eminent authority on the natural history of North America, and it did provide some evidence during the American negotiations to acquire Russian America, but the cooperation was probably not motivated by that goal.
Comments or questions are welcome.

Примечания:

16 Others include Charles A. Hubbard, and Constantine Drexler.

17 Debra Lindsay, The Modern Beginnings of Subarctic Ornithology: Northern Correspondence to the Smithsonian Institution, 1856—1868 (Winnipeg: Manitoba Record Society, 1991), xiv.

18 Kennicott to Baird,17 November 1859, in Lindsay, Modern Beginnings of Subarctic Ornithology, 22.

Russian America and Eastern Siberia: The materials of regional scientific practical conference with international participation (Kyakhta city, August 14 th, 2009). Irkutsk, 2011

Courtesy of Architectural-ethnographic museum «Talci»